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Abstract The hermeneutical circle is one of the most fundamental but up to 
now contentious doctrines  with a long tradition in the history of 
hermeneutics. In what follows, the purpose of my contribution is to 
reconsider the Heidegger–Gadamer dialogue on the circle (Zirkel, 
Zirkelhaftigkeit), with an emphasis on how they shed new light on the whole 
issue. 
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Introduction 
In the case of Heidegger and Gadamer, the issue of the hermeneutical circle (in other words: 
the whole idea of the circular structure of interpretation) is about the close interrelation 
between understanding and prejudices, i.e. about the idea that the entire process of 
understanding includes certain preliminary expectations. I will argue that their dialogue on the 
circle led to the discovery of an original link between hermeneutics and logic. (I) First of all, I 
shall make a brief presentation of the conceptual background rooted in Antiquity of the circle 
whose criticism led to the two different hermeneutic accounts of circle. (II–III) Then I shall try 
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to expound the way in which Heidegger transformed the classical concept of the circle as a 
mode of thought, first in 1927 when he introduced his famous discussion on the hermeneutic 
circle in § 32 of Being and Time (and the auxiliary paragraphs: § 23, § 2 etc.). Afterwards, I shall 
analyse the way in which, in dialogue with Heidegger, Gadamer re-conceptualized the previous 
starting point in the chapter on the hermeneutic experience of his Truth and Method (entitled 
“The Hermeneutical Circle and the Problem of Prejudices”) with the aim of justifying the model 
of knowledge applied by the humanities.  
 
I. The origins of the circle and the history of hermeneutics 
 
The circle as an epistemological problem 
Both Heidegger and Gadamer distanced themselves from that circularity whose 
emergence can be traced back to the logical tradition, especially to Aristotle’s logic and his 
theory of the ancient syllogism, whereas the circle implies the presence of a flaw in our 
thinking or an erroneous means of formal argumentation.
1
 In classical logic, the circle is only 
used in a negative sense, as a circulus vitiosus. It means a circular reasoning (or reasoning in a 
circle)
2
, which occurs in a formal argument or in a definition of the concept. It is also known as 
paradoxical thinking. Such a circle is to be avoided as it violates the laws of logics. Petitio 
principii is one of the forms of circular reasoning which can be translated to “begging the 
question”, as well as “assuming the initial point”. The meaning given by Aristotle ties to the 
type of dialectical argument discussed in Book II of his Topics, where the false reasoning lies in 
the fact that the original point had already been constructed in the desired conclusion. The 
arguer uses the basic statement itself to verify that, or in inversed form, the arguer excludes 
from the argument even what he wants to refute. The term “idem per idem” also refers to a 
similar process which is a certain kind of tautology from the Bible. It means that we attempt to 
verify the same for the same, so we add no new component to the consideration of the thing. 
This “logical” form or idiom appears in the revelation of God’s name, when God says “I will be 
what I will be”,
3
 in the book of Exodus. 
The logical concept of the circle can also be found in the modern theory of science; 
however, it also exists as a metaphysical metaphor, in this broader sense the circle as a vicious 
and devilish circle first appeared in Horace’s Ars poetica. Horace was the first who described 
                                                          
1
 See: Aristotle, Prior Analytics, trans. Robin Smith (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 90–
91. (Another edition: Aristotle, The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Book II 16, reprinted ed. 
by Harold P. Cook and Hugh Tredennick (London/ Cambridge: Williem Heinemann Ltd. – Harvard 
University Press,  1962³)  485, 487, 489, 65a4-7 and  64b28–65a26. 
2
 “Zirkel im Beweis” and  Heidegger, Sein und Zeit 17
 th
  ed., (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993) 11. Translation: 
Idem, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1996) 6. 
3
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the disappointing situation in which a series of events can become negative circumstances by 
making an existential state or a given condition progressively worse. Each recurrence of 
problems reinforces the previous one, that is, the troubles return cumulatively within the same 
logic. This fatal connection between cause and effect – where each outcome must further 
increase the effectiveness of causality – also entered the fields of philosophy, theology, 
mathematics, economy and, last but not least, the pathology of medicine. 
Consequently, it is important to note that Kant integrated a positive approach of this 
logic, by using the circle within antinomic oppositions of the Critique of Pure Reason and 
thereby he almost anticipated the solution of the issues raised by Heidegger and Gadamer. In 
the chapter Antinomies, Kant discovered the contradictions in our pure reason, contradictions 
which he believed to be in accordance with the human nature of reason. Furthermore, in the 
chapter Doctrine of Dialectics concerning the traditional domains of metaphysica specialis 
(psychological, cosmological and theological ideas), he revealed the transcendental illusions 
through which we let ourselves divert from the experimental use of reason. These illusions give 
us the hope that we can expand the scope of our pure reason beyond the limits of all possible 
experiences. This kind of circularity in both antinomies and transcendental illusions involves a 
logic moving in a cycle or a logical circularity. However, from Kant’s viewpoint, this type of 
circularity is neither a logical fallacy nor a lack of logic, but it is inherent in the nature of our 
finite human reason and it can be described as a natural state of reason. The system of thought 
in Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle will be developed from the critique of this logical tradition 
and from its radicalization. 
 
The circle in the humanistic tradition 
In contrast with Heidegger, Gadamer is determined by another direction, namely by the 
ancient classical rhetoric which has also known a kind of circularity – it has been simply 
regarded as a rule (die Regel)
4
 applied to the relation between the whole and its parts, since 
the rhetoricians compared the perfect speech with an organic body (with the relationship 
                                                          
4
 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Vom Zirkel der Verstehen (On the Circle of Understanding)” in Gesammelte 
Werke 2. Hermeneutik II. (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993) [henceforth referred to as GW 2]  
57.: “Die hermeneutische Regel, daß man das Ganze aus dem Einzelnen und das Einzelne aus dem Ganzen 
verstehen müsse, stammt aus der antiken Rhetorik…(The hermeneutical rule that we must understand 
the whole, from the individual and the individual from the whole stems I from ancient rhetoric” 
(emphasis added). Bibliographical note: Gadamer’s complete works are cited with the abbreviation GW 
(Gesammelte Werke 1–10. Tübingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) from 1985 to 1995) followed by volume 
number, comma and page numbers. All emphasis is original unless otherwise specified. If there are 
references to both the original German text and the corresponding English translation, they are 
separated for example as follows [GW 1, 376. In English: 364.]. 
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between head and limbs *“mit… dem Verhältnis von Haupt und Gliedern”+).
5
 At this point, the 
ancient humanistic tradition was combined with the new endeavours of the Reformation. 
“Luther and his successors transferred this image, familiar from classical rhetoric to the process 
of understanding and they developed the universal principle of textual interpretation.”
6
 Within 
the outlines of this approach, the circle has a philological meaning that refers to a type of 
writing and of understanding the texts in which a unity (composition, coherence) is created 
between the whole (universum) and the parts (regions). The same rule must have been applied 
both in the case of the Bible and the classical texts: the parts of a text can be understood 
within the whole and vice versa: the whole with its parts. The German classical philologist 
August Boeckh used the German term “hermeneutische Cirkel” in his lectures entitled 
“Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften” in 1809.
7
 Nevertheless, 
Schleiermacher thematically formulated the methodological principle of the circle which 
surpassed the circular interplay of understanding the whole and the parts.
8
 Dilthey himself also 
participated in the dispute on the circle,
9
 which became an integrative part of the hermeneutic 
debates of the 19
th
 century, but he partially stressed his suspicion that the “circularity” 
(Zirkelhaftigkeit) can be seen as an “aporia” or a “danger” of subjectivity in hermeneutics. 
Dilthey’s lifework further preserved the idea that knowledge reached its peak in the age of the 
Enlightenment, which is why he regarded as problematic the situation in which the 
interpreter’s knowledge was led by certain pre-suppositions, anticipations and personal 
interests. 
 
II. The hermeneutic circle in Heidegger’s approach 
 
Intuition and phenomenological sight 
Heidegger completely transformed the classical concept of the circle as a model of 
thought, first in 1927 when he introduced his famous discussion on the hermeneutic circle in § 
                                                          
5
 For further information, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 1: Hermeneutik I. Wahrheit und 
Methode, (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1990) *henceforth: GW 1+ 179. Translation: Idem, Truth 
and Method, Second edition, trans. and revised by Joel Weisheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (London, 
New York: Continuum, 2006) 176.  
6
 Gadamer, GW 1, 179. [In English: 176–177.] 
7
 August Boeckh,  Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften, Nachdruck. 
(Darmstadt, 1966) 102, 109, 125, 131, 139, 140, 142.: “hermeneutische Cirkel”. 
8
 Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik, ed. Manfred Frank (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag 1977). 
9
 Wilhelm Dilthey, “Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik”, in Idem, Die geistige Welt. Einleitung in die 
Philosophie des Lebens. 1. Hälfte. (Gesammelte Schriften 5) Stuttgart/Göttingen: Taubner und 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
 
1990) 317–338., here: 338.  
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32 of Being and Time. At this point, primarily by criticizing Husserl’s phenomenology, 
Heidegger was led to develop the hermeneutical circle as a fore-structure (Vor-struktur) of 
understanding, or in other words, he spoke of a circular structure that first of all makes the 
significance of the anticipatory nature of understanding (i.e. that of the “Entwurf”-character) 
visible and this circularity is an essential, positive part of his fundamental ontology concerning 
the understanding of the Being. At the turn of the century, Paul Natorp and Edmund Husser l’s 
controversy was one of the most significant debates which arose together with the 
problematisation of being and possibility of intuition: the concept of “viewing” (Anschauung). 
Natorp and the Neo-Kantians rejected the possibility of intuition; by contrast, in Husserl’s 
investigations, intuition appears as a source of knowledge. 
With the help of rejecting the intuition, in his 1887 article entitled “On the Objective 
and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge”, Natorp levelled a critique against Ernst Mach’s 
empirical positivism of phenomenological physics; by contrast, Husserl attempted to 
appreciate the sense of “positivism” in an entirely new way. Turning against the Neo-Kantian 
epistemological-transcendental approach, Husserl claims that phenomenologists are genuine 
positivists (die echten Positivisten).
10
 Of course, this positivism is not identical with the 
positivism of the empirical sciences, limited to empirical experiences. On the contrary: 
phenomenology is a genuine transcendental positivism directed towards the positive gained 
from reductions. In fact, it scrutinises the problem of philosophising focussed on the thing (die 
Sache selbst), which for Husserl, in Ideen I, is the “principle of all principles” (Prinzip aller 
Prinzipien).
11
 The ultimate basis of knowledge is nothing other than a “genuine giving intuition” 
(originär gebende Anschauung). To return to the thing means to simply accept what presents 
itself to us by the “originally presentive” nature of intuition. The idea is not that Husserl 
practiced a phenomenology against logic, but at the core of his research on the origins or the 
event of pure phenomenalization, Husserl claims that there is no need to do logical and 
argumentative operations, but it should be our task to intuitively cover up the things 
themselves. For Husserl, the “normal” means of approaching our experience through the 
natural disposition differs from the phenomenological intuition; however, we can shift our 
attention towards the mode of experience through a phenomenological disposition, in order to 
gain the ability of intuition in a transcendental sense or to let ourselves be guided by the things 
themselves. Husserl expressed a maxim that can be formulated thus: “Back to the things 
themselves!” It had a liberating power for the members of the Phenomenological Movement, 
and at the same time, it meant leaving any subjectivism behind and turning to the objects. In 
Husserl’s transcendental method, its phenomenological character is to be given by an eidetic 
method which leads to intuition and to the original giving of the things themselves. 
                                                          
10
 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. I. 
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2002), 38. 
11
 Husserl, Ideen I, 43. 
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Phenomenological sight and hermeneutical circle 
The phenomenological intention that remained very productive for Heidegger was 
formulated thus: “to let ourselves be guided by the things themselves” in understanding, but 
unlike the “phenomenological sight” introduced by Husserl, Heidegger referred to a 
“hermeneutical circle”. The problematic point is that the expressions “das Gegebene”, 
“Geben”, “Es gibt” and “Gabe”, hermeneutically speaking, have completely different meanings 
than in phenomenology. In Heidegger’s work, the givenness is something preliminarily given 
(Vorgegeben), something given (als etwas gegeben), we are always beyond a pure or a final 
givenness. In Heidegger’s view, Husserl’s notion of intuition conflicts with the fact that the 
things always come to be accessible to us in a kind of interpretative way, therefore all human 
understanding transcends the given things. We cannot meet the things in their objective 
skeletonised, unpainted being, but rather we understand them as something (etwas als etwas). 
So much so, that even this grasping of something which is free of the “as”-structure must be a 
privation of seeing, a non-understanding in Being and Time.
12
 The hermeneutic feature of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology is equally due to rendering questionable the “pure” description 
(free of any act of interpretation) and the ‘immediateness’ according to classical Husserlian 
phenomenology. There is no “pure” description, everything is “contaminated”, i.e. every 
description has already been “infected” with interpretations. Our understanding is 
characterized by a threefold circular structure: these are the “fore-having,” “fore-sight,” and 
“fore-conception” (“Vorhabe,” “Vorsicht,” “Vorgriff,”),
13
 and through this circularity Heidegger 
clearly demonstrates that a hermeneutic dimension is crucial to the structure of the 
experience. As Heidegger would say, not even a primary experience could ever be a form of 
“pure” seeing or intuition, since it bears a structure of interpretation from the very start; thus, 
the idea of unprejudicedness desired by both Descartes and Husserl is only one of many other 
prejudices. 
 
“Interpretation is never a presuppositionless grasping of something previously given. 
When the… interpretation likes to appeal to what »is there,« what is initially »there« 
is nothing else than the self-evident, undisputed prejudice of the interpreter, which is 
necessarily there in each point of departure of the interpretation as what is already 
»posited« with interpretation”.
14
  
 
Heidegger asked whether we should accept the phenomena as “finalities”, or the phenomena 
showed a kind of connection with the anticipatory and projecting character of understanding 
                                                          
12
 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (§ 32) 148. *In English: 140.+ 
13
 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (§ 32) 150. *In English: 140–141.] 
14
 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (§ 32) 150. *In English: 141.+ 
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(with the so-called Entwurf-character). Through the hermeneutical circle, Heidegger states that 
something we see as a pre-given is in fact a “position”, a “standpoint” which already operates 
as a prejudice. Here, the pre-given I have not understood before in its original sense is my own 
superficial knowledge. Understanding becomes an act of interpretation only if we are also 
aware of the constantly exercised self-understanding of understanding itself, that is, only if, in 
interpretation, our understanding can appropriate what has always already been understood 
and familiar. The “circle” belongs to the structure of meaning and simultaneously to the 
essence of understanding itself as a distinctiveness. Gadamer claims that Heidegger’s deep 
insight culminated not so much in showing the circularity and making us aware of the circle, 
but in showing that “this circle possesses an ontologically positive significance”.
15
 
 
Heidegger’s critique of “prejudices”:  
Vormeinung and the problem of the inconstancy of the Self (Unselbständigkeit) 
Although the concept of “Vormeinung” applied by Heidegger essentially belongs to 
the circular structure of human understanding as an antecedent opinion, a prior assumption or 
a pre-judgment that the interpreter previously possessed, in Being and Time it has a negative 
or pejorative sense; occurs as a problem in § 25–27, when Heidegger deals with the question 
of togetherness and community with others (Mitsein, Mitdasein). His discussion has explicitly 
turned to clarify an inadequate relationship with the Self and the possibility of its failure to 
stand by itself. In context of our Being-in-the-World, solitude (Einsamkeit) has been given 
priority over the public sphere – the publicness (Öffentlichkeit) and the world of the majority 
(die Welt der Vielen) –, whereas the latter indicated a fallen world closely tied to the world of 
inauthenticity, idle talk and the They (Uneigentlichkeit, Gerede, das Man). While solitude has a 
positive sense, “Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with [others], its possibility is a proof 
for the latter”, “*k+nowing oneself is grounded in primordially understanding being-with 
*others+”.
16
 As a negative side of the being-with-others, Heidegger identified the dictatorship of 
the They (the Anyone) and a mass-media-instituted public sphere in which the “subject” of the 
everyday world is called the neuter (the They) and the human Dasein loses himself.
17
 In this 
everydayness, as Heidegger says, “the other can become one who is dependent and 
                                                          
15
 Gadamer, GW 1, 271. [In English: 269.] 
16
 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (§ 26) 120; 124. *In English: 113; 116.+ 
17
 “Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of being of the they, constitute what we know 
as ‘publicness’. Publicness initially controls every way in which the world and Da-sein are interpreted, and 
it is always right, not because of an eminent and primary relation of being to ‘things,’ not because it has 
an explicitly appropriate transparency of Da-sein at its disposal, but because it does not get to ‘the heart 
of the matter’, because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness. Publicness obscures 
everything, and then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to 
everybody.” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (§ 27) 127. *In English: 119.+) 
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dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.”
18
 This does not 
mean that we grow up thrown into our own historicity and that we never begin to think of the 
world through a tabula rasa. Rather, Heidegger’s criticism is focused on how the fore-
meanings and prejudices have always had a serious impact on our life beyond all personal 
morality (conscience) or against our morality, too. Our life can be determined by the 
dictatorship of publicness in a way that, in this everydayness, no one is himself; in the 
impersonal world of the They-self  “Da-sein is dispersed in the they and must first find itself”,
19
 
e. g. the masses talk through us, too. Which is why we are also able to feel outraged by what 
the others do. The young Heidegger criticized the public sphere, that is, the They-world from a 
linguistic viewpoint. The rootlessness of language (the idle talk and public interpretedness) is 
going to generate the human means of relating to a world that would not have access to the 
phenomenon and that would lead to the unspoken dictatorship of publicness, over the things 
and to the levelling-down characteristic (Nivellierung)  of the phenomenon.  
Heidegger continues to be sceptical of any public interpretedness (öffentliche 
Ausgelegtheit), but, in his later works, he considers that it belongs to the technical world rather 
than to the Anyone-world. 
The hermeneutical circle seems to be neither an epistemological problem, nor a 
methodological prescription but, as Gadamer points out, “a description of the way interpretive 
understanding is achieved”.
20
 The circle belonging to the ontological structure of 
understanding has become a crucial part of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology; he asserted 
that interpretation is not the acknowledgment of what has been understood, but rather the 
development of prior possibilities projected in understanding and the factical understanding 
itself is also achieved in the light of anticipations, pre-assumptions and fore-meanings, always 
based on some prior pre-cognition. The circle is not an inadequacy, but the self-understanding 
of our understanding – man always understands based on some presuppositions or prejudices. 
The ultimate goal is no longer to escape from this circle, but to enter it in the right way.
21
 In 
Heidegger’s view, a concretion of the development of the hermeneutical circle appeared in his  
three Frankfurt lectures from 1936, entitled The Origin of the Work of Art, where Heidegger 
was partly influenced by Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics.
22
 
                                                          
18
 Heidegger, Ibid, (§ 26) 122. *In English: 114.+ 
19
 Heidegger, Ibid, (§ 27) 129. *In English: 121.+ 
20
 Gadamer, GW 1, 271. [In English: 269. – Italics modified] 
21
 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (§ 32) 153. *In English: 143.+ 
22
 “So we must move in a circle. This is neither ad hoc nor deficient. To enter upon this path is the 
strength, and to remain on it the feast of thought – assuming that thinking is a craft. Not only is the main 
step from work to art, like the step from art to work, a circle, but every individual step that we attempt 
circles within this circle.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art (1935–36)”, in Off the Beaten Track 
,trans. Julien Young and Kenneth Haynes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–85. here: 2. 
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In short, not only the opinions but also the prior conditions of understanding were 
reconstructed in approaching the hermeneutical circle; in this sense, Heidegger’s discussion 
contributed to the discovery of a hermeneutical “logic” from a trans-logical perspective, and it 
simultaneously offered access to an original link between hermeneutics and logic. 
 
III. The hermeneutical circle and the Problem of Prejudices in Gadamer 
 
In dialogue with Heidegger’s approach, Gadamer re-conceptualized the hermeneutical 
circle in the chapter on the hermeneutic experience of his Truth and Method (under the title 
“The Hermeneutical Circle and the Problem of Prejudices”), while his aim was to justify the 
form of knowledge of humanities. Heidegger had still not spoken of prejudices at all in a literal 
sense of this word, but the discussion on this relevant issue took the form of a description of 
the “Vormeinung”. On the one hand, Gadamer reinforced the consequences derived from 
Heidegger’s initiative according to which there was never an absolute zero in understanding; in 
the absence of prejudices, we would not be able to understand anything – prejudices are the 
very conditions that make understanding possible and, in the end, they prove to be a source of 
knowledge or truth. On the other hand, he criticized the Heideggerian idea that the only one 
point in which our relationship with the tradition was determined by the undiscussed and the 
unconscious, the prevailing prejudices (“Vormeinungen”) represented the Anyone-world in the 
dictatorship of publicness.  
 The hermeneutical circle was a central part of the whole realm of a theory of 
hermeneutic experience by explaining it in a way that Gadamer called the rehabilitation of 
prejudices. First and foremost by sketching the way in which this word received its 
contemporary negative meaning, Gadamer’s basic attempt was to retrieve (wiedergewinnen) 
and rehabilitate other productive meanings of prejudices that are part of the tradition, but this 
approach is far from our way of thinking today. Gadamer managed to reconstruct a positive 
meaning of the prejudices, still regarded as a sinking stream in the mainstream of tradition.  
 
What is at stake in his discussion is the means through which we are able to find a way 
to access our history and what the human sciences are generally about. “Our question is how 
hermeneutics… can do justice to the historicity of understanding.”
23
 Furthermore, Gadamer 
outlined a main dilemma of whether both the “prejudices” (Vorurteil) and “the thing itself” (die 
Sache Selbst) should be valid synchronically. There are two main criteria: (1) the first, last and 
constant task is that every interpreter must direct his gaze “on the things themselves” and let 
himself be guided by the things, however, (2) the interpreter always understands based on 
                                                          
23
 Gadamer, GW 1, 270. [In English: 268.] 
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some prejudices and, in Gadamer’s formulation, we read “the text with particular expectations 
in regard to a certain meaning”.
24
 
This dilemma had already occurred in the Enlightenment and the modernity, since 
prejudices were discredited and completely exiled as a solution from the realm of scientific 
knowledge.
25
 The Enlightenment’s basic belief was that a genuine science required freedom 
from prejudices. Husserl also took in a similar direction insofar as he kept in mind an 
understanding without any prejudices in his article Philosophy as a Rigorous Science about 
1910-11.
26
 By considering philosophy to be a rigorous science, Husserl believed that man can 
be free from unexplored assumptions and unfounded postulates.
27
 Against him, Gadamer 
clearly argued that this issue was not a self-evident either/or question. There was also one 
prejudice of the Enlightenment that defined its essence: this fundamental prejudice was “the 
prejudice against prejudice itself”, the overcoming of all prejudices or the absence of 
prejudices would  also prove to be a prejudice; therefore, Gadamer emphasized that this is the 
point in which the attempt to critique this demand of the Enlightenment must start and 
revising it “opens the way to an appropriate understanding of the finitude” which dominates 
our humanity and our historical consciousness, since “the recognition that all understanding 
inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust”.
28
  
Without rehabilitating the prejudices, Gadamer goes so far as to say that we would 
ignore the access to our history and the possibility of knowing in humanities. The term 
“prejudice” in itself is a neutral expression that may have both a positive and a negative value. 
Even in the Enlightenment this word has acquired a negative connotation. Based on their 
sources, the Enlightenment made a distinction between the two types of prejudices: between 
(1) the prejudice due to human authority (/the prejudice from partiality) and (2) due to 
overhastiness, further modifying the scope of prejudices, it was restricted to the absence of a 
foundation. In doing so, something counts as a prejudice only if it has no foundation in the 
things themselves – i.e., if it is unfounded, a judgment made in the absence of proper 
consideration of the thing by assuming it uncritically. A global requirement was at that time 
that everything had already been decided before the judgment seat of reason, which only gave 
                                                          
24
 Gadamer, GW 1, 271. [In English: 269.] 
25
 Gadamer, GW 1, 275–276. [In English: 273.] 
26
 See H Edmund usserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, ed. Wilhelm Szilasi (Quellen der 
Philosophie 1) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965). The first 1965publication and its detailed 
analysis with afterword of  the volume entitled Philosophy as a Rigorous Science is connected to Wilhelm 
Szilasi’s name. This volume has been one of the most available editions of Husserl’s works and hence 
many have quoted it. 
27
 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Hua 1: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Cartesian Meditations 
and the Paris Lectures), Husserliana, Bd. I, ed. Stephan Strasser. (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1950) 6; 9; 25. 
28
 Gadamer, GW 1, 274; cf. 280–281. [In English: 272 f.; cf. 277.] 
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it legitimacy. The fact that the unfounded judgment may have been seen as a fallacy or error 
was problematic, the negative meaning of prejudices implied that they already always meant 
false judgment, the possibility that an unfounded judgment could also be truth was not taken 
into consideration. However, fluctuation can be experienced in several countries – while the 
Enlightenment in England and France militated for a complete freedom from prejudices, the 
German Enlightenment recognized that we have been educated with “truth prejudices”,
29
 
influenced by Luther’s reformation activity. A justification through rational knowledge can 
never be achieved to its perfection. There are more things what we have to accept rather than 
to revise or dismiss in order to live our everyday lives. “That is why” writes Gadamer – “the 
prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his 
being.”
30
  
 Referring to the word “prejudice” that stems from the Latin noun praejudicium, in the 
judiciary process the praejudicium simply meant a prejudgment as a provisional legal verdict 
(Vorentscheidung) before the final verdict was reached. Gadamer’s main admittance is that 
besides all the negative consequences, it can also receive a positive meaning, insofar as there 
are legitimate prejudices (prejuges legitimes). In the interest of discovering a productive 
meaning of the prejudices, Gadamer separated what had merged into one another during the 
Enlightenment: he made a distinction between the dogmatic thinking and the prejudiced one.
31
 
In fact, to criticize the prejudices is to criticize the dogmatic commitments, it is perhaps the 
reason why the prejudices had a negative sense. In his argument against the metaphysic 
dogmatism, Kant spoke of the maxim Sapere aude! “Dare to use your own reason” (/Dare to 
know!) while levelling a serious critique of the “Schwärmerei” as a form of wishful thinking 
(enthusiasm).
32
 In a broader sense, the Enlightenment’s biblical criticism also struggled against 
the dogmatic claims of the Bible. In his 1986 article entitled Reason and Practical Philosophy, 
Gadamer’s thesis was that dogmatism is not simply the issue of the content –: e. g. to 
dogmatically believe in something – but an attitude towards something (a kind of treatment of 
the questions). An anti-dogmatic way to discuss the questions is to continuously make the 
debate or even the epoche accessible to the discussion. The idea is to never accept something 
as a dogma, but to do so in the way that excludes the possibility of discussion. Gadamer does 
not consider the romantic critique of the Enlightenment to be a solution, because it also 
shared the pre-assumptions of the Enlightenment, by only reversing its values but adopting the 
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 This is a metaphysical attitude which tends to transgress the laws of pure reason and its own 
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same schema, thus the Romanticism “itself ends the Enlightenment” while “it evolves as 
historical science”.
33
  
 Dilthey and the Historical School are characterized by historicism: the past is regarded 
as something “historically” understandable. Gadamer saw this relation to the past not as the 
normal case of understanding that sees the other (the past, the text and the whole world) as 
an equal partner. Rather, the historical understanding is similar to the situation of exams, of 
legal interrogations or of therapies, i.e., it is an asymmetric case. In historicism, Gadamer 
criticized the craving for a pure objectivity. One cannot be an outsider as if reflected outside of 
the history of the world from a superposition; therefore the requirement of unprejudicedness 
or the discrediting of all prejudices only marks that we are still unaware of our finitude. 
Prejudices pertain to the historical structure of understanding, therefore all understandings 
should take account of their own prejudices. The core of the problem is not represented by the 
prejudices that we have, but “it is the pack of our non-recognized prejudices that makes us 
deaf to what speaks us in tradition”. Hidden prejudices certainly dominate us from behind the 
scenes so that all understandings can be guided by them but changeable in no way. Even the 
hidden prejudices hinder us from letting ourselves be guided “by the thing itself”; by contrast, 
being aware of prejudices can offer us an openness towards the “thing” and a sensitivity 
towards the alterity of the text through a hermeneutically trained consciousness (ein 
hermeneutisch geschultes Bewußtsein).
34
 Gadamer uses the inversion of logic between the 
question and answer to explain the essence of historical understanding, the event character; in 
this sense Gadamer is committed to finite thinking. To understand a tradition is to understand 
the question what a response is. In a Gadamerian sense, a hermeneutically trained 
consciousness may be circumscribed by its relation to the prejudices, namely this 
understanding will be concerned not merely with forming its own anticipations but with 
becoming aware of them so as to verify them. The hermeneutical circle cannot exist without 
(1) “sensitivity” (Empfänglichkeit) or “hermeneutical goodwill” and (2) the “fore-conception of 
completeness” (Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit), which describe two sides of the same: the 
experience of concrete otherness that includes the entry into hermeneutics. “Every encounter 
with tradition …involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present. The 
hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation of 
the two but in consciously bringing it out.”
35
 
The real place of the hermeneutic experiences is within the otherness that operates 
against our expectations in a both positive and negative sense. The encounter with tradition 
implies that something addresses us, calls for understanding but it is possible only when our 
own prejudices are properly brought into play and when it is put at risk and provoked. The 
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encounter with a historical document, a foreign culture and its language, a cherished dream, or 
a meeting with the other can provide this provocation. The characteristic of this test lies in the 
process of questioning. Only in this process can we “distinguish *1+ the true prejudices, by 
which we understand, from [2] the false ones, by which we misunderstand”.
36
 All 
understanding continuously forms fore-projections (Vorentwurf), but this is only anticipatory in 
nature if it is to be confirmed by the “things”, therefore “*t+he only “objectivity” here is the 
confirmation of a fore-meaning in its being worked out”.
37
 For Gadamer, it is crucial that the 
hermeneutical circle of understanding expands in concentric circles (in konzentrischen 
Kreisen),
38
 constantly widening the understood unity of meaning. In the hermeneutical circle, 
Gadamer allows us to envision the unity of meaning in terms of a reality; by contrast, it is no 
longer possible to affirm Hegel’s absolute viewpoint positing the end of the history, because 
“the idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity”.
39
 
These arguments and consequences which Gadamer developed in the analysis of the 
circle in his Truth and Method generated a famous debate between Habermas and Gadamer 
during the 1960s and the 1970s, but this dispute would be the matter of a future investigation.  
 
Conclusion: on the relation between hermeneutics and logics      
Georg Misch (1878–1965) and Hans Lipps (1889–1941) already elaborated how logics 
may be intertwined with hermeneutics as a “hermeneutic logic” (hermeneutische Logik). In this 
respect, Gadamer also considered fundamental works
40
 both Misch’s book titled Der Aufbau 
der Logik auf dem Boden der Philosophie des Lebens
41
 and Lipps’ one titled Untersuchungen zu 
einer hermeneutischen Logik of 1938
42
, on which  Otto Friedrich Bollnow wrote a significant 
critical interpretation.
43
 In the 1960s and 1970s, after the publication of Truth and Method as 
its history of effect, as it is known, a broader discussion about the controversy of hermeneutics 
and logic unfolded between Gadamer, Habermas and later the Frankfurt School (Karl Otto 
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Apel, Rüdiger Bubner, Hans Joahim Giegel and Claus Bormann). The issue was whether to 
approach hermeneutics from an old traditional logical perspective, or if there was a “new” 
form of logic within hermeneutics, a hermeneutical “logic” beyond all controversy. This debate 
is still open today, but especially based on Heidegger’s early works, Gadamer was capable of 
further thinking this issue and of increasing its productivity through the hermeneutic circle and 
the problem of prejudice. His approach went beyond the modern problem of method between 
the natural and human sciences and beyond the foundation-debate (Grundlagenstreite and 
Letztbegründungsansprüche) of the 20
th
 century. Heidegger left open the possibility of a new 
logic. Instead of logic, however, Gadamer reinforced the significance of the rhetorical tradition 
in hermeneutics and, starting from the guiding concepts of humanism, he highlighted the 
priority of “Bildung” and the importance of humanity (traced back to Hegel and Herder). 
Naturally, from a Gadamerian standpoint (within hermeneutics) the classical, formal logic is 
still valid, but the universality of hermeneutics will no longer depend on it.   
 
 
 
